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I. Introduction
Debates concerning treatment decision-making in the embattled domain of mental health
law tend to centre upon the right to refuse treatment.1 In these debates, refusal is
positioned as the last card to be played in a contest between the individual identified as in
need of treatment (for whom the prospect of treatment constitutes a threat of profound,
identity-annihilating violence) and the health provider charged with advancing the
individual’s and/or the public’s welfare.2 Focusing on the right to refuse -- while
scrutinizing the limits on that right – has the merit of drawing attention to the dynamics
of power and resistance inherent in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health
disability. Moreover, the right to refuse gives concrete expression to an essential
dimension of the value of liberty – i.e., liberty as “negative freedom.”3 The importance of
freedom from state-backed coercion – or, more precisely, the importance of the guarantee
that such freedom will not be limited except in accordance with the procedural and
substantive protections integral to public justification – cannot be overstated. Where the
freedom in question engages the preservation of one’s bodily integrity as well as one’s
mental states, then its importance must be recognized as of the highest order.
And yet negative freedom is but one expression of the normative construct of autonomy
that gives shape to the law on treatment decision-making in and beyond mental health
settings. That is, as this chapter explores, the law on consent to psychiatric treatment is
concerned not only with voluntariness but also with what it means for treatment choice to
be adequately informed – an element of consent placing positive legal duties on health
providers. Moreover, debates on the law structuring psychiatric treatment choice have in
recent years been increasingly oriented to the prospect of duties placed on both health
professionals and more broadly on the state to provide supports and resources (beyond
information) to assist individuals in exercising legal capacity and so in actualizing the
right to medical self-determination.
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1
A few diverse examples from the Canadian literature on the right to refuse psychiatric interventions
(reaching back to the 1980s and 90s) include C.H. Cahn, “The ethics of involuntary treatment: the position
of the Canadian Psychiatric Association” (1982) 27 Can J Psychiatry 67; Bonnie Burstow & Don Weitz,
Shrink Resistant: The Struggle Against Psychiatry in Canada (Vancouver: New Star, 1988); Isabel Grant,
“Mental Health Law and the Courts” (1991) 29:4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 747; Thomas G. Gratzer and
Manuel Matas, “The Right to Refuse Treatment: Recent Canadian Developments” (1994) 22:2 Bulletin of
the Am Academy of Psychiatry and Law 249; Sarah MacKenzie, “Informed Consent: The Right of
Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Treatment” (1993) DJLS 59.
2
See Sophie Nunnelly’s argument in Chapter xx that strategies of public justification for forced treatment
tend to shuttle unstably between conceptions of public safety and individual welfare.
3
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1969) 118.
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The aim of this chapter is to go back to the basics on consent to treatment, starting with
the right to refuse and building from there. Part II addresses the leading judicial
statements on the value of medical self-determination, and in light of these statements,
considers what is at stake in psychiatric treatment choice. Part III explores the three core
elements of valid consent to treatment -- namely that consent be voluntary, informed and
capable -- with attention to variation in the law amongst provinces and territories, and
some lines of analysis and critique specifically applicable to mental health care contexts.
Part IV considers new directions in law and policy clustering around the concept of
supported decision-making – a concept forged through domestic and international
disability rights advocacy, which urges fundamental re-examination of the
interrelationship of legal capacity, autonomy and distributive justice.4
II. Fundamental legal values – and what is at stake in consent to psychiatric
treatment
The Supreme Court of Canada has placed a high priority on the right to “decide one’s
own fate”5 in respect to medical decisions. The leading statements on point were recently
consolidated in the unanimous judgment in Carter v. Canada:
The law has long protected patient autonomy in medical decisionmaking…competent individuals are — and should be — free to make decisions
about their bodily integrity” [. . .]. This right to “decide one’s own fate” [. . .]
underlies the concept of “informed consent” and is protected by s. 7’s guarantee
of liberty and security of the person [. . .]. [T]he right of medical selfdetermination is not vitiated by the fact that serious risks or consequences,
including death, may flow from the patient’s decision.6
The value of medical self-determination applies with comparable intensity in disputes
about psychiatric treatment. In Starson v Swayze,7 a judgment addressing a disputed
assessment of decision-making capacity under Ontario law (discussed later in this
chapter), the majority observed:

4

For a critique of the failure to shift from a paternalistic and coercive model of mental health law and
policy in Canada to a model oriented instead to addressing the social determinants of mental health, see H.
A. Kaiser, “Canadian Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of Redirecting the Ship of State” (2009) 17
Health Law Journal 139.
5
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 at para 67, citing A.C. v. Manitoba
(Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181 at para 39. See also the valuable
analysis of the background case law in Simon N Verdun-Jones & Michelle S Lawrence, “The Charter Right
to Refuse Treatment: A Comparative Analysis of the Laws of Ontario and British Columbia Concerning the
Right of Mental-Health Patients to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment” 46:2 UBC Law Review 489 at 490-498.
6
Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 at para 67 [citations omitted].
7
2003 SCC 32, [2003] 1 SCR 722.
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The right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is fundamental to a person’s
dignity and autonomy. This right is equally important in the context of treatment
for mental illness.8
In Starson, the Court further observed (now citing the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Fleming v. Reid9):
Few medical procedures can be more intrusive than the forcible injection of
powerful mind-altering drugs which are often accompanied by severe and
sometimes irreversible adverse side effects.10
This statement has been criticized on the argument that it overplays the dangers of
psychiatric medications and minimizes their positive effects.11 In this vein, the human
needs orientation to the law on consent to psychiatric treatment argues for attention to the
ways that psychiatric medications may not only restore health but also liberty (i.e.,
freedom from involuntary confinement), and autonomy (i.e., the rationality that informs
self-direction).12 The critics argue more specifically that the courts failed to appreciate
what was at stake in both Fleming v. Reid and in Starson – both cases involving
psychiatric treatment refusal in the context of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. In
such cases, the critics argue, the putative interest in treatment refusal should be more
explicitly or carefully weighed against the possibility of indefinite detention and its
effects not only on the individual him or herself, but also other patients and staff.13
One response to the critics is simply to return to the overwhelming priority placed on
medical self-determination in the leading cases. This suggests, if not a clear normative
preferencing of the interest in bodily and psychological integrity over the interest in
freedom from restricted mobility, then in any case a determination that individuals should

8

Ibid at para 75.
(1991), 4 OR (3d) 74 (CA).
10
Ibid at p 88, cited in Starson v. Swayze, supra note x at para 75.
Robins JA lists a range of side effects of antipsychotic drugs, including:
muscular side effects known as extra- pyramidal reactions: dystonia (muscle spasms,
particularly in the face and arms, irregular flexing, writhing or grimacing and protrusion of the
tongue); akathesia (internal restlessness or agitation, an inability to sit still); akinesia (physical
immobility and lack of spontaneity); and Parkinsonisms (mask- like facial expression, drooling,
muscle stiffness, tremors, shuffling gait). The drugs can also cause a number of non- muscular
side effects, such as blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, weight gain, dizziness, fainting,
depression, low blood pressure and, less frequently, cardiovascular changes and, on occasion,
sudden death. (ibid)
11
See John E. Gray, Margaret A. Shone & Peter F. Liddle, Canadian Mental Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed
(Markham: LexisNexis, 2008) at 11-14 (distinguishing a “human needs” perspective on mental health law
and policy -- based in a biological model of the roots of mental health disability, and more specifically, the
thesis that “lack of insight” into illness or the need for treatment has a biological cause) from a “civil
libertarian” perspective (one “that views mental health legislation as an often-unjustifiable intrusion by the
state on the freedom of the individual”); and at 45 (objecting to the terms “mind controlling” and “mind
altering” used by Robins JA in Fleming v Reid).
12
Ibid at 235-242.
13
Ibid at 242-247.
9
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be given their “choice of hells,”14 i.e. the right to weigh on their own terms the relative
awfulness of the prospects (as these are constructed in the dominant institutional
framework) of indefinite detention without treatment or possible release conditional on
treatment. Another response turns upon the point that there continue to be serious
controversies about the safety and efficacy of psychiatric medications.15 Related to this is
the observation that it cannot be predicted with certainty what effect (within a broad
range of possible effects) a given drug will have in the individual case – whether in terms
of side effects or primary intended effect.16 In other words, one cannot simply assume
that individuals such as Starson or Reid will or would ever respond to medications in a
manner deemed medically optimal.
Finally, discussion of what is at stake in psychiatric treatment choice must take account
of the complexity of how treatment and non-treatment feel to the individual “from the
inside.” For instance, psychiatric medications and the conditions for which they are
prescribed may interact with personal identity in complex ways, not easily translated to a
typical risk-benefit profile. Thus while some who are diagnosed with mental health
conditions may have no difficulty distinguishing themselves from mental states they
would readily characterize as expressive of a disease, others understand their experiences
in ambivalent or even positive terms – as part (even if a troubled part) of one’s identity or
of making meaning of one’s life.17 Added to this is the further complexity that treatment
refusal may be one piece of a broader politically and personally coherent objective of
expressing resistance to what for many are highly adversarial encounters with the mental
health system (i.e. police apprehension, restraints, forced injection). All this counsels an
attitude of deference to, or respect for, the will and preferences of those who refuse
psychiatric treatment.
III. Consent in Law: Voluntary, Informed, and Capable
The common law, along with Quebec’s Civil Code,18 expresses the value of medical selfdetermination by requiring that consent be voluntary, informed, and capable. Several
provinces have codified these three requirements.19

14

Carla McKague in I. Shimrat, Call Me Crazy: Stories from the Mad Movement (Vancouver: Press Gang,
1997) at 71. McKague was co-counsel for the applicants in Fleming v Reid.
15
See, e.g., James Davies, Cracked: Why Psychiatry is Doing More Harm Than Good (London: Icon
Books, 2003).
16
See, e.g., J. A. Lieberman et al., “Time Course and Biologic Correlates of Treatment Response in First
Episode Schizophrenia,” (1993) 50 Archives of General Psychiatry 369; J. A. Lieberman et al.,
“Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Drugs in Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia,” (2005) 353 New England
Journal of Medicine 1209.
17
See Peter Bartlett & Ralph Sandland, “Conceptualizing Mental Health Law” in Mental Health Law:
Policy and Practice, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 at 2-10 (“Who are the insane?)
18
Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c C-1991. For elaboration of the distinct approach to liability for
unconsented-to touching and lack of informed consent in Quebec’s civil law tradition, see Paul B. Miller,
Sujit Choudry, and Angela Campbell, “Legal Regulation of the Physician-Patient Relationship”
(particularly the section entitled “Civil Responsibility in Quebec Civil Law”)
“http://www.royalcollege.ca/portal/page/portal/rc/resources/bioethics/primers/legal_regulation_of_the_phy
sician_patient_relationship
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As discussed in more detail by Sophie Nunnelley in chapter X, the approach to treatment
decision-making for people admitted involuntarily to psychiatric hospital tends to depart
from these background legal requirements, although the precise terms of departure vary
across Canadian provinces and territories. British Columbia effectively removes the
requirement for an involuntary patient’s consent on the fiction of “deemed” consent.20 In
contrast, in Ontario, the law on consent to treatment is the same in cases of involuntary
psychiatric hospitalization as in all other civil contexts.21 Thus involuntary patients have
the right to refuse treatment as well as to have their prior capable refusals respected. In
still other provinces and territories, capable as well as prior capable refusals of treatment
may be overridden according to processes and standards specific to involuntary
psychiatric patients.22 Finally, in a few provinces (Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and
Newfoundland and Labrador), where involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is contingent
upon incapacity to make decisions about treatment in or admission to psychiatric
hospital, capable refusals are not contemplated among those with involuntary status.23 I
set aside the question of the constitutionality of these different limits on the right to
refuse treatment, to be explored in Sophie Nunnelly’s chapter. In what follows, I deal
with the law on consent to treatment beyond the special case of involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization. However, it is important to note that even where statute law authorizes
involuntary treatment or other physical force to be applied to persons who are
involuntarily in psychiatric hospital, there are still necessarily legal limits on such
interventions. I make note of some of these limits in what follows.
1. Voluntary consent
Treatment or other bodily interference that is not consented to may give rise to liability in
battery at common law, or charges under the Criminal Code (for instance, assault
(s.265(1))).24 Alternatively, where the violation takes place in the exercise of a statutory

Other provinces, as detailed below, have laws that speak to incapacity and substitute decision-making in
health or mental health contexts, but just these four additionally set out the generally applicable
prerequisites for valid consent to treatment. See BC’s Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility
(Admission) Act, RSBC 1996, c 181 [BC HCCFA]; Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO 1996, c
2, Sched A [Ontario HCCA], and Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 30; PEI’s Consent to
Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-17.2; and the Yukon’s Decision-Making
Support and Protection to Adults Act, SY 2003 c 21. See also the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64,
arts. 11 to 25. And see Patricia Peppin, "Informed Consent" in J. Downie, T. Caulfield & C. Flood, eds.,
Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3rd ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2007) at 188. See also
Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, [2013] 3 SCR 341, 2013 SCC 53 at paras 22-23, 52-53 (commenting on the
relationship between Ontario’s HCCA and the common law on consent to treatment).
20
BC Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s.31.
21
Ontario HCCA, supra note x; Ontario Mental Health Act, RSO 1990, c M.7 [Ontario MHA].
22
See, e.g., Alberta’s Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13, [Alberta MHA] s.29. For further examples
and discussion, see Chapter X [Sophie Nunnelly’s chapter].
23 Saskatchewan Mental Health Services Act SS 1986-85-86, c M-13.1 [Sask MHSA], s.24(2); Nova
Scotia Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, SNS 2005 [NS IPTA], c 42, ss.17&18; Newfoundland
Mental Health Care and Treatment Act, SNL 2006, c M-9.1 [NL MHCTA], s.17.
24
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. One might also consider forcible confinement (s.279(2)), or the use
of force not “required or authorized by law” (s.25(1)). I thank my colleague Archie Kaiser for assistance
19
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discretion, it may give rise to damages for a breach of the s.7 Charter right to liberty and
security of the person.25
The plaintiff in a battery action in tort need only establish a non-trivial touching or
interference with her person;26 proof of (further) injury is unnecessary.27 The most
straightforward cases are those where there was not even an attempt to obtain consent to
the intervention or treatment in issue. However, a battery may also occur where consent
is putatively given but vitiated by fraud, duress, undue influence, or incapacity.28 The last
of these legal concepts is dealt with further on in the chapter.
Fraud may vitiate consent, for example, where one medication is represented as another,
or medication is delivered in a covert fashion (e.g., surreptitiously mixed into orange
juice).29 A further example would be the administration of medication that was “not
capable of constituting a therapeutic response to the patient’s condition,” yet was
presented to the individual “as necessary.”30 For example, consider the case of an
antipsychotic medication administered for the purpose of control or administrative
convenience, but presented (falsely) as “necessary” to assist with sleep or agitation.31 In
such a case, it is arguable that this is a battery, as “the defendant’s purpose is outside the
plaintiff’s permission”.32
Consent may also be vitiated by duress, which describes the use or threat of force.33
Consider a situation in which a person is confronted by staff at the ready to restrain, and
in that condition, is asked for “consent” to injectable treatment. This would seem an
obvious case for arguing the vitiation of consent. That said, determining what constitutes
with identification of these Criminal Code offences. See also Archie Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law”
Chapter 8 in Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed (Markham: Butterworths, 2002) 251 at 297.
25
See Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28. And see also Hneihen v. Centre for
Addiction and Mental Health 2014 ONSC 55 (CanLII) at paras 98-114.
26
Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v. Scalera, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 551 at paras 8 &16.
27
Reibl v. Hughes, 1980 CanLii 23 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 880 at p 890.
28
See Allen Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 9th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2011)
[Linden & Feldthusen] at 80-82.
29
See Anten v. Bhalerao 2013 ONCA 499 (CanLII) at para 9: “The respondent’s evidence about the
medication regime and the effect of that medication on the appellant was confusing. It appeared that the
first medication, including the anti-psychotic Risperidone, was at some point given to the appellant in her
orange juice, “to improve her compliance.” It was unclear when this medication regime began, when the
hospital began to give it to her in her orange juice and whether the appellant knew it was in her orange
juice. Then, on December 21, the appellant was given Risperidone in an injectable form. However, the
appellant objected because of side effects.” (italics added)
30
See Dean v. Phung [2012] NSWCA and White v Johnston [2015] NSWCA 18 at paras 62-74, esp paras
69 & 73.
31
See David Bruser et al, “Use of Antipsychotics Soaring at Ontario Nursing Homes” (Apr 15, 2014) The
Star
(http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/04/15/use_of_antipsychotics_soaring_at_ontario_nursing_hom
es.html)
32
White v Johnston, supra note x at para 69.
33
Linden & Feldthusen, supra note x at 81. The authors add: “nor is consent extracted from someone who
is under the influence of drugs,” citing Beausoleil v. La Communaute de Soeurs de la Charite (1964), 53
DLR (2d) 65 (Que QB). I put aside the question of whether drug-related impairment short of legal
incapacity (eg, even mild sedation) might vitiate consent for the purposes of battery in health care contexts.
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a vitiating threat of force may be tricky in psychiatric treatment settings, where, even for
voluntary patients, consent may be said to occur in the shadow of lawful coercion. For
instance, some mental health laws provide that a voluntary patient may be forcibly
detained for psychiatric assessment if he or she attempts to leave (and other diagnosis and
risk-based conditions are met).34
In other contexts, the courts have not been receptive to the idea that consent may be
vitiated by the strategic application of incentives and threats in institutional settings
where there is lawful authority for the deprivation (or anticipated deprivation) of
liberty.35 For example, in R. v Deacon,36 the Federal Court of Appeal held that it was
within the jurisdiction of the National Parole Board37 and not a breach of s.7 of the
Charter, to make compliance with medication (in this case, anti-anxiety medication and
medication to reduce sex drive) a condition of parole for a long-term offender convicted
of sexual assault.38
As with duress, undue influence invalidates consent in a manner that is grounded in the
concept of coercion. In Norberg v Wynrib, La Forest J. defined undue influence as “an
illegitimate use of power or unlawful pressure which vitiates a person's freedom of choice."39
Again it is important to take note of the qualifier “illegitimate,” i.e. without lawful
authority or justification. While La Forest J. indicated that this doctrine will have to be
developed and applied in a manner that takes account of “the factual context of each
case,”40 in Norberg he stated two qualifying criteria: 1) “an overwhelming power
imbalance” (i.e., “a marked inequality in the respective powers of the parties”) and 2)
“exploitation” (i.e., manipulation of the vulnerable party for self-interested ends). While
these statements were made in connection with sexual battery, one might reflect on
whether or how the doctrine might have purchase in psychiatric treatment contexts, for
instance in response to the conscription of patients for research where there is little or no
benefit to the patient and considerable benefit to the physician.

34

NS IPTA, s.7; P.E.I. Mental Health Act, RSPEI 1988, c M-6.1 [PEI MHA], s.5(5).
See (apart from the Deacon case, infra) Stewart v. Postnikoff, 2014 BCSC 707 (CanLII). Mark Lunney
and Ken Oliphant discuss a similar line of analysis in the UK jurisprudence, noting that the judgment in
Freeman v Home Office (no 2) [1984] QB 524 “upheld a prisoner’s apparent consent to medical treatment,
ruling that the institutional pressures acting on the prisoner’s mind did not affect the genuineness of that
consent.” (Tort Law: Texts and Materials, 5th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 84.
36
Deacon v. Canada (Attorney General), [2007] 2 FCR 607, 2006 FCA 265 (CanLII). See also R. v. Payne,
2001 CanLII 28422 (ON SC) at paras 138-139.
37
Under its statutory mandate, the Board is to impose conditions of parole that are “reasonable and
necessary in order to protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of the
offender.” (Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, C 20, s.134.1(2)).
38
Under the long-term offender designation (different from the status of “dangerous offender” which
designates an indeterminate period of incarceration), prisoners are eligible for community release after
serving their full sentence, but they must adhere to conditions imposed by the parole board for up to 10
years. See Criminal Code, s.753.1; HMTQ v. Gibbon, 2005 BCSC 935 (CanLII) at para 114.
39
Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 per La Forest J at 246, citing George B Klippert, Unjust
Enrichment (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 156.
40
Noberg v. Wynrib, ibid at 246.
35

7

A further twist on the doctrine of undue influence has involved arguing systemic vitiation
of consent in an institutional environment marked by an extraordinary imbalance of
power. Such a claim was advanced in Joanisse v. Barker.41 This was an application for
certification of a class action based in subjection to forensic psychiatric hospital
programming alleged to have featured experiments involving “solitary confinement,
sensory deprivation, humiliation, force, restraints (cuffs), the use of hallucinogens and
delirium-producing drugs and other forms of physical and mental abuse, under the guise
of [the supervising psychiatrists’] "science".” Drawing on Norberg, the plaintiffs sought
to advance as a common issue the question of whether genuine, voluntary consent was
precluded by the coercive conditions in the facility. Although the judge rejected the
certification bid on the ground that the genuineness of consent must be determined on an
individualized basis, he observed that there was a sufficient evidentiary foundation on
which to argue that the coercive institutional conditions had systematically undermined
valid consent.42
All of the above notwithstanding, there are two exceptions at common law to the
requirement of consent to medical treatment: emergency and public necessity.
At common law, medical treatment provided without consent does not constitute a
battery where it “is necessary to save the life or preserve the health of a person who, by
reason of unconsciousness or extreme illness, is incapable of either giving or withholding
consent.”43 Kaiser has argued that the emergency exception, which arose in connection
with cases involving persons in unconscious or barely conscious states (and in clear need
of therapeutic intervention in order to preserve life or prevent “serious and permanent
physical impairment”), is wholly inapplicable to the mental disability setting.44 However,
certain statutes allow for emergency treatment in response to mental health crisis where
incapacity and a severe risk to health are in place.45 That said, the determination of
41

2003 Canlii 25791 (court file no 00-CV-199551CP).
Ibid at para 30. “There seems no doubt that at a trial of the common issues, the plaintiffs would be able to
adduce expert evidence of the coercive effects of the environment in which the programs were conducted.
In affidavits and reports filed on the motion, qualified psychiatrists provided opinions that support the
position that a voluntary consent to participate in the programs was impossible.”
43
Malette v. Shulman, supra at para 20, citing Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260, 60 C.C.C. 136
(N.S.S.C.); Parmley v. Parmley, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 81, [1945] S.C.R. 635; Mulloy v. Hop Sang, [1935] 1
W.W.R. 714 (Alta. C.A.). More robust criteria are relayed in a passage from Prosser & Keeton on Torts
that is cited by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Malette v Shulman -- for instance, there, the exception is
limited to situations where intervention is necessary to prevent “serious bodily injury or death” (at para 20).
44
Archie Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law” Chapter 8 in Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed (Markham:
Butterworths, 2002) 251 at 295.
45
See, e.g., Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, which provides for “emergency treatment” where an
individual who is incapable of a decision about a prospective treatment is “apparently experiencing severe
suffering or is at risk, if the treatment is not administered promptly, of sustaining serious bodily harm”:
HCCA, s.25(1) & (2). More explicitly inclusive of mental health-based “emergency” is the Northwest
Territories Mental Health Act, which authorizes “emergency medical or psychiatric treatment” (contingent
on incapacity and lack of timely access to a substitute), where the treatment is “necessary to preserve the
life or mental or physical health” of the person, and where a delay in treatment “would create a reasonably
foreseeable risk of injury to that person or any other person.” Mental Health Act, RSNWT 1988, c M-10,
[NWT MHA], s.20(1)(c). Distinct provisions authorizing use of restraints / means of control are cited in
note y, infra.
42
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incapacity required both at common law and under such statutory provisions is arguably
likely to be impossible or near impossible to make in the context of a crisis.46 Moreover,
it is highly questionable whether the conventional institutional responses to mental health
crisis (use of physical or chemical restraints or seclusion) could be characterized as
“therapeutic”.47
The common law defence more likely to be raised in efforts to justify forcible
confinement or restraint is that of “public necessity.” 48 This defence is expressly aimed
at permitting the use of force to protect third parties – or potentially (here the law is
murkier, and more starkly at odds with the right to medical self-determination) the person
him or herself.
The legality of protective measures aimed at control was addressed by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Wellesley Hospital v. Lawson.49 In that case, a non-psychiatric patient sued
a hospital after he was injured by a psychiatric patient. The majority stated that the
hospital owed “an independent duty to supervise and keep under reasonable control
patients who the hospital knows or ought to have known have propensities to violent
behaviour.”50
This reasoning was relied upon, and apparently extended, in Conway v. Fleming.51
There, Conway’s claim for battery and breach of s.7 Charter rights arising out of
subjection to seclusion and chemical restraints was rejected on the basis that the common
law supported
a right and a duty to restrain Conway when necessary to protect him, other
patients, or others lawfully on the premises (staff or other patients) from harm and
to prevent endangerment to the safe environment of the hospital or facility.52
The extension of the doctrine of public necessity to permit the use of chemical restraints
or seclusion to protect an individual against him or herself stands in marked tension with
the circumscribed terms of the emergency exception. It moreover stands in tension with
the insistence in the wider jurisprudence on respect for capable (even foolish or highly
risky) choices. However, statutory mechanisms in some mental health laws contemplate

46

On the challenges to health professionals’ judgments in relation to “emergency modalities” including
modalities of control (i.e physical and chemical restraints and seclusion), see Elyn R. Saks, Refusing Care:
Forced Treatment and the Rights of the Mentally Ill (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) at 164172.
47
See Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law” supra note x at 296.
48
See Linden & Feldthusen, supra note x at 99: “Public necessity involves the interference with private
rights in order to preserve the interests of the community at large”. The defence of protecting third parties
may apply where the rationale for intervention is “to save others from danger” (ibid at 97).
49
1977 CanLii 29 (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 893.
50
Ibid at 899.
51 [1996] OJ No 1242 (Div Ct) (QL) aff’d (1999) 1999 CanLii 19907 (On SC), 43 OR (3d) 92, 173 DLR
(4th) 372 (On CA).
52
Ibid at para 278.
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just such a contingency.53 These mechanisms vary, with some requiring a threat of
bodily harm54 to the individual or another, and others only a risk of “harm”;55 most
articulate a standard of “least restrictive means” and some require formal documentation
of the use of restraints.56
The case law does not set clear or precise limits on the common law authority to
restrain.57 However, an essential part of the defence of public necessity (and the related
defence of protection of third parties) is that the one acting to protect must act
reasonably,58 weigh the proportionality of the response against the risk,59 and otherwise
contain the threatening behaviour in the least restrictive manner possible.60 Given
evidence amassed in recent years about the significant risks associated with use of
restraints (physical, chemical and environmental),61 these justificatory requirements pose
53

See Mental Health Act, RSPEI 1988, c M-6.1, s.24(12) (“psychiatric treatment” for the purpose of
“keep[ing] the patient under control”); Alberta Mental Health Act, s.30; Manitoba Mental Health Act, s.1 &
29(4); Nunavut / Northwest Territories Mental Health Act, s.36.1; Yukon Mental Health Act, s.18; Ontario
Mental Health Act, s.1(1) (“restrain”) and s.53.
54 Ontario’s Mental Health Act authorizes actions to place a patient “under control when necessary to
prevent serious bodily harm to the patient or to another person by the minimal use of such force,
mechanical means or chemicals as is reasonable having regard to the physical and mental condition of the
patient” (s.1(1)). Section 14 of Ontario’s MHA further states that nothing in it “authorizes a psychiatric
facility to detain or to restrain an informal or voluntary patient”. See M (Re), 2009 CanLII 45568 (ON
CCB).
55 Section 1(1) of Manitoba’s MHA defines “restrain” as to “place under control when necessary to prevent
harm to the patient or to another person” (and see s.29(4)). Section 24(12) of PEI’s MHA permits the use
of psychiatric medication or restraints “in order to keep the patient under control and to prevent harm to the
patient or to another person.”
56 See, e.g., Ontario MHA, s. 1(1) & s. 53; Nunavut / Northwest Territories MHA, s.36.1(2); Manitoba
MHA, s.1 (“restrain”) & s.29(4).
57
There are a few statements of note in this connection in Hneihen v. Centre for Addiction and Mental
Health 2014 ONSC 55 (CanLII), 301 C.R.R. (2d) 124, e.g., at para 78: “The defense of public necessity is
available for certain narrowly defined situations of “imminent peril” (citing John Murphy, Christian
Witting & James Goudkam Street on Torts, 13th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), para. 24 at p.
340; Linden & Feldthusen, supra note x at 99.
58
See Linden & Feldthusen, supra note x at 97.
59
Simon Verdun-Jones & Michelle Lawrence, supra note x at 520, propose that the standard for
intervention should be “imminent danger to the safety” of the patient or third parties, and that it is
necessarily implicit that “the forcible administration of medication also must be delivered with reasonable
skill and care and represent the least intrusive option available.” Finally, they note that the defence should
justify continuing the involuntary intervention only “so long as there is a genuine threat of violence or
aggression.” (520-21).
60
Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law” supra note x at 297. Kaiser adds that “non-statist alternatives” [i.e,
“[p]rofessional standards and practices, hospital accreditation policies, coroner (and related) reports, the
media and advocacy organizations”] “can assist in reducing or eliminating the practice of restraint and
seclusion”. See also H.A. Kaiser, “Restraint and Seclusion in Canadian Mental Health Facilities: Assessing
the Prospects for Improved Access to Justice” (2001) 19 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 391. And
see Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Promoting Safety: Alternative Approaches to the Use of
Restraints (Toronto: Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2012).
61
Wanda K Mohr et al, “Adverse Effects Associated with Physical Restraint” Canadian Journal of
Psychiatry (June 2003) https://ww1.cpa-apc.org/Publications/Archives/CJP/2003/june/mohr.asp; US
General Accounting Office. Mental health: improper restraint or seclusion use places people at risk. (GAO
publication HEH-99-176). Washington (DC): USGAO; 1999; B.C. Dickson & M.S. Pollanen, “Case
Report: Fatal thromboembolic disease: A risk in physically restrained psychiatric patients” (2009) 16(5)
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a high bar likely only to be met by an imminent risk of serious bodily harm.62
2. Informed Consent
The second of the three core elements of valid health care consent is that the decision be
informed.63 Failure to adequately inform one who is facing the prospect of a medical
intervention may give rise to liability in negligence.64 There are two primary steps to a
negligence action of this type. First, the plaintiff must establish inadequate disclosure,
i.e., breach of the standard of care. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the failure to
disclose caused compensable injury.65 It is at the causation stage that persons seeking
damages for breach of the duty of disclosure most commonly fail.66
While the duty of disclosure is rooted in law and in the value of autonomy, it has also
been argued to produce therapeutic benefits. That is, enabling individuals to learn about,
reflect upon and form opinions about their therapeutic options increases the likelihood
that the approaches adopted will be responsive to their needs and experienced as
enhancing well-being.67
Disclosure
The duty of disclosure requires that health professionals

Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 284; R. Gallop et al, “The experience of hospitalization and
restraint of women who have a history of childhood sexual abuse,” (1999) 20 Health Care for Women
International 401; Secure Rooms and Seclusion Standards and Guidelines: a Literature and Evidence
Review (BC Ministry of Health, September 2012) at 9; D.K. Knox & G.H. Holloman, “Statement of the
American Association for Emergency Psychiatry Project BETA Seclusion and Restraint Workshop” (2012)
13(1) West J Emerg Med. 35–40.
62
See Verdun-Jones & Lawrence, supra note x at 520; Kaiser, “Restraint and Seclusion in Canadian Mental
Health Facilities: Assessing the Prospects for Improved Access to Justice” supra note x. The 2013 Report
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture observes that, given the absence of therapeutic justification, the
use of restraints or “prolonged seclusion . . . cannot be legitimate under the medical necessity doctrine,”
and may “constitute torture and ill-treatment” under the UN Convention. The Report calls for “an absolute
ban on all coercive and non-consensual measures, including restraint and solitary confinement of people
with psychological or intellectual disabilities,” in “all places of deprivation of liberty, including in
psychiatric and social care institutions” (Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/22/53, (Feb 1, 2013)). See also
Torture in Healthcare Settings: Reflections on the Special Rapporteur on Torture’s 2013 Thematic Report
(American University Washington College of Law Centre for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 2014)
(http://antitorture.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/PDF_Torture_in_Healthcare_Publication.pdf).
63
This common law right is also reflected in legislation. See, e.g., BC’s HCCFAA, supra note x, s.6(e)&(f)
and Ontario’s HCCA, supra note x, s.11(1)-(3).
64
Reibl v. Hughes [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880.
65
This is more properly conceived as two distinct elements: proof of compensable damage and proof of
causation. However, I have opted for simplicity in this brief discussion.
66
See Gerald Robertson, “Informed Consent 20 Years Later” (2003) Health Law Journal 153.
67
See e.g. Bruce J Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment (Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association, 1997) at 338-42, and Bruce J. Winick, “The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications” (1996) 2:1 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 137.
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ensure the patient understands the nature of the procedure, its risks and benefits,
and the availability of alternative treatments before making a decision about a
course of treatment.68
This implies disclosure of all “material risks”69 including high-probability/low magnitude
and low probability/high magnitude risks.70 The health professional must also answer
any specific questions from the patient relating to the treatment.71
In presenting alternative treatments, the health professional must include the alternative
of non-treatment.72 The expectation that alternatives will be disclosed is even greater
where the alternatives carry fewer risks than the primary intervention under
consideration.73 Some judges have restricted the requirement to disclose alternatives to
those falling within the physician’s own clinical expertise. 74 Others have adopted the
moderately higher standard of disclosure of those “options that in [the physician’s]
reasonable medical judgment are appropriate for the patient.”75 In a further modification
of the standard, the Ontario Court of Appeal has recently stated that a physician must
advise the patient of all alternatives identified through the exercise of reasonable medical
judgment -- including those the physician regards as likely to be less efficacious in the
circumstances.76
What constitutes reasonable medical judgment may be a matter of contention. Yet it is
arguable, for instance, that adequate disclosure about treatment options for depression or
anxiety (two of the most prevalent and highly medicated of any health conditions in
North America) should include discussion of psychotherapy, given strong evidence of the

68

Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, 2013 SCC 53, [2013] 3 SCR 34 at para 18.
Hopp v. Lepp, 1980 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 192 at 210. The passage states in addition the
requirement to disclose “any special or unusual risks attendant upon” the proposed intervention.
70
Hopp v. Lepp, ibid at p.209-210, and see Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp., [1995] 4 SCR 634, 1995 CanLII
55 (SCC) at para 24. Also see the decision of McLachlin J in Rawlings v. Lindsay, [1982] BCJ No 209, 20
CCLT 301 at 306.
71
Hopp v. Lepp, ibid at 210.
72
See Zimmer v. Ringrose, 1981 ABCA 60 (CanLII), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 215 at para. 16 (CA); Haughian v.
Paine, 1987 CanLII 987 (SK CA) at p.26. In the latter case, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal determined
that a physician had breached the duty of disclosure in failing
to advise adequately, or at all, of the available options of no treatment, or
conservative management. While it may have been open to the respondent not to
recommend these options by way of treatment, the patient was entitled to be
advised that these alternatives were open to him. (para 38)
73
Kern v. Forest, 2010 BCSC 938.
74
See Bafaro v. Dowd, 2008 CanLII 45000 (ON SC), at para 42, citing Sanders v. Sheridan, [2000] S.J.
No. 403 (Q.B.): (“The Courts have held that where a physician feels a particular procedure is clinically not
an option for him to perform on the patient, the physician does not have a duty to provide the option”)
75
Van Dyke v. Grey Bruce Regional Health Centre [2005] OJ No 2219 (On CA) leave to appeal refused
[2005] SCCA No 335 (SCC) at para 65 citing Bucknam v. Kostiuk (1983), 1983 CanLII 1865 (ON SC), 44
O.R. (2d) 102 at 114 (HCJ), aff’d (1986), 1986 CanLII 2686 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (2d) 187 (CA).
76
See Van Dyke v. Grey Bruce Regional Health Centre, ibid at para 66, and Patricia Peppin, "Informed
Consent" in J. Downie, T. Caulfield & C. Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3rd ed. (Markham,
Ont.: Butterworths, 2007) 153 at 165-166.
69
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relative efficacy and safety of this alternative.77 In accordance with the above-noted
statements of the Ontario Court of Appeal, this should hold whether or not the health
professional is personally equipped to provide this alternative or is convinced of its
relative efficacy.78
Even where individuals are subject to involuntary treatment, legislation may require
physicians to inform patients of the nature and risks of treatment and to take the patient’s
views into consideration.79 However, these statutory obligations are markedly truncated
in comparison with the common law duty to inform.
Turning to common law exceptions to the duty to inform, there is a possibility that health
professionals in psychiatric treatment settings may rely (with what they believe to be
legal justification) on the highly questionable category of exemption from disclosure
known as therapeutic privilege. In Reibl v. Hughes, 80 Laskin C.J. briefly adverts to this
doctrine, which he indicates has been recognized in U.S. law:
It may be the case that a particular patient may, because of emotional factors, be
unable to cope with facts relevant to recommended surgery or treatment and the
doctor may, in such a case, be justified in withholding or generalizing information
as to which he would otherwise be required to be more specific.81
This principle was restated the following year in the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision
in Videto et al v. Kennedy.82 There, it was said that an individual’s “emotional condition”

77

American Psychological Association, “Recognition of Psychotherapy Effectiveness” (approved August
2012) at http://www.apa.org/about/policy/resolution-psychotherapy.aspx; S. De Maat et al, “Relative
efficacy of psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy in the treatment of depression: A meta-analysis” (2006)
16:5 Psychotherapy Research 566; G. Speilmans et al, “Psychotherapy versus second-generation
antidepressants in the treatment of depression: a meta-analysis” (2011) 199 Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease 142. See also John Huntsley et al, “The Effectiveness and Efficiacy of Psychological Treatments
(Canadian Psychology Association, Sept 2013), and L.A. Pratt, D.J. Brody & Q. Gu, “Antidepressant use in
persons aged 12 and over: United States, 2005–2008” NCHS data brief no 76 (Hyattsville, MD: National
Center for Health Statistics, 2011).
78
In some circumstances there may be a dispute about whether psychotherapy falls within the appropriate
standard of care. See the US case Morris v. Ferriss, 669 So.2d 1316, 1996, where the judge found that
psychotherapy was not an appropriate treatment for the plaintiff’s “organically based” condition, such that
there was no duty to discuss this alternative.
79
For example, section 25(3) of the Saskatchewan MSHA, supra note x, provides that even where treating
an involuntarily detained patient without consent in accordance with the Act, the attending physician
shall, to the extent that it is feasible given the patient’s medical condition, [. . .]
consult with the patient, explain or cause to be explained to the patient the purpose,
nature and effect of proposed diagnosis or treatment and give consideration to the
views the patient expresses concerning the patient’s choice of therapists, the
proposed diagnosis or treatment and any alternatives and the manner in which
diagnoses or treatments may be provided.
80
[1980] 2 SCR 880, 1980 CanLII 23 (SCC)
81
Ibid at 895.
82
(1981), 1981 CanLII 1948 (ON CA), 17 C.C.L.T. 307
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and/or his or her “apprehension and reluctance to undergo” 83 a prescribed procedure may
warrant non-disclosure.
At least one judge has observed that the doctrine of therapeutic privilege sits uneasily
with the respect for autonomy underlying the right to choose and refuse treatment, and
has refused to recognize the doctrine.84 Commentators, too, have suggested that the
doctrine is, if a valid common law defence to non-disclosure at all, then one that stands
“on narrow and shaky grounds.”85 Arguably, the doctrine ought to be rejected in favour of
a duty to ensure that information is relayed in a manner that is compassionate and as
supportive as possible of careful, critical deliberation -- no matter what the person’s
diagnosed health condition or mental state.86
It is notable that the law on disclosure does not compel dialogue about what might be
termed structural risks -- for example, systemic post-market underreporting of adverse
drug events, unrepresentativeness of the research subjects in pre-market clinical trials, or
industry suppression of negative clinical trial results.87 Nor does the law mandate
discussion of alternative, critical understandings of conditions or diagnoses (whether
schizophrenia, depression, or feminine sexual dysfunction).88 These matters fall within
the purview of bioethics and social critique rather than law. Law, for its part, maintains a
careful attitude of deference toward medical norms and judgment, even while anchoring
disclosure obligations in the circumstances of the particular patient. Is there a role for
law in constructing conditions more conducive to critical deliberation about one’s values
and therapeutic options – and so more promoting of medical self-determination?

83

Ibid at 315-16: “The emotional condition of the patient and the patient's apprehension and reluctance to
undergo the operation may in certain cases justify the surgeon in withholding or generalizing information
as to which he would otherwise be required to be more specific”
84
See Meyer Estate v. Rogers (Gen. Div.), (1991) 2 OR (3d) 356; [1991] OJ No 139 (QL)
(ON SC) (Section 4: “Conclusions on Therapeutic Privilege”): “The doctrine has no place in the law on
consent in Canada; rather, it has the potential to “"swallow" the doctor's obligation of disclosure and thus to
override the requirement for informed consent”.
85
Patricia Peppin, “Informed Consent” supra note x at 174; Archie Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law” supra
note y at 297.
86
Mitchell Law Corporation et al, 015 MBQB 88 (CanLII), (Docket CI 12-01-77745) (relying on
McInerney v MacDonald, [1992] 2 SCR 138, 1992 CanLII 57 (SCC), the judge recognizes a continuing
role for the doctrine of therapeutic privilege in Canadian law, yet limits its application in the case at hand to
giving support to a duty to disclose the relevant information in a “constructive” manner (at paras 141-142,
146, 167, 169, 175).
87
See, e.g., Ben Goldacre, Bad Pharma: How Medicine is Broken, and How We Can Fix It (London:
Fourth Estate, 2012).
88
See e.g., Mary Boyle, Schizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion? (London and New York: Routledge, 1990);
Joanna Moncrieff & Hugh Middleton, “Schizophrenia: A Critical Psychiatry Perspective” (2015) 28(3)
Curr Opin Psychiatry 264; David Pilgrim & Richard Bentall, “The medicalization of misery: A critical
realist analysis of the concept of depression” (1999) 8(3) Journal of Mental Health 261; Alyson K. Spurgas,
“Interest, Arousal, and Shifting Diagnoses of Female Sexual Dysfunction, or: How Women Learn About
Desire” (2013) 14 Studies in Gender and Sexuality 187; Lisa Cosgrove, “The DSM, Big Pharma, and
Clinical Practice Guidelines: Protecting Patient Autonomy and Informed Consent” (2011) 4:1 International
Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, Special Issue: Feminist Perspectives on Ethics in Psychiatry
11 esp at 14-17.
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Causation
As stated in Arndt v. Smith,89 the test for causation in medical negligence cases involving
failure to disclose is an objective90 one, which
requires that the court consider what the reasonable patient in the circumstances
of the plaintiff would have done if faced with the same situation. The trier of fact
must take into consideration any “particular concerns” of the patient and any
“special considerations affecting the particular patient” in determining whether
the patient would have refused treatment if given all the information about the
possible risks.91
This test has proven a steep challenge for plaintiffs, as judges often conclude that a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position92 would have deferred to the health
professional’s recommendations to proceed even if the requisite risks or alternatives had
been disclosed.93 This reasoning may render legally irrelevant individual characteristics
such as a tendency to adopt a suspicious, rather than trusting, relationship with health
providers, or a sustained interest in exploring alternatives to medication.
3. Capable Consent
Decision-making capacity at common law and in mental health / health care consent
laws
The last of the three essential requisites of valid consent is capacity.

89

[1997] 2 SCR 539.
See Vaughan Black and Dennis Klimchuk, “Comment on Arndt v. Smith” (1997) 76 Canadian Bar
Review 569 for a critique of the concept “modified objective test” used by Cory J in Arndt v Smith, ibid,
and the argument that Cory J states no compelling justification for rejecting a subjective test for causation.
Of particular relevance is the authors’ critique of Justice Cory’s repeated depiction of the plaintiff in this
type of action as irrational and unreliable – and in particular, as harbouring unaccountable concerns about
risk (e.g., a belief that a temporary red rash on the skin is a “highly significant and dangerous sign of evil
spirits in the body” (at para 14)). As Black and Klimchuk point out, similar concerns said to warrant
rejection of a subjective test of causation do not arise in the jurisprudence addressing failure to disclose in
commercial contexts.
91
Arndt v. Smith, supra note x per Cory J at para 6, summarizing the standard for causation specific to
actions in negligence arising out of failure to disclose in the doctor-patient relationship, from Reibl v.
Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880, 1980 CanLII 23 (SCC).
92
According to Cory J, the trier of fact must take into account any “particular concerns” of the patient and
“any special considerations affecting the particular patient,” as such “the patient’s reasonable beliefs, fears,
desires and expectations” (Arndt v Smith, supra note x at para 9).
93
See Gerald Robertson, “Informed Consent 20 Years Later” (2003) Health Law Journal (Special Edition)
153. Robertson argues, however, that one effect of Reibl v Hughes may have been to shift clinical practice
toward greater disclosure. That is, while plaintiffs continue to lose most often at the causation stage,
Robertson suggests that the case law since Reibl is marked by an increase in the proportion of cases in
which doctors are determined to have met the duty of disclosure. (at 155)
90
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The capacity to make decisions about health care is framed at common law and in
legislation as decision-specific as well as time-sensitive (such that capacity status may
fluctuate).94 In Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, McLachlin CJ for the majority stated:
The common law doctrine of informed consent “presupposes the patient’s
capacity to make a subjective treatment decision based on her understanding of
the necessary medical facts provided by the doctor [i.e., “the nature, purpose, and
consequences of the proposed treatment”] and on her assessment of her own
personal circumstances”. When such capacity is lacking, the patient is not in a
position to exercise his autonomy by consenting to or refusing medical
treatment.95
That is to say that the doctrine of informed consent carries the implicit expectation that
the individual is able to understand the matters disclosed and apply them to his or her
own case. Where this ability, or capacity, is lacking, consent is invalid and the
consequence is that the intervention constitutes a battery (subject to an alternative
defence). McLachlin CJ’s description of the common law expectations of decisionmaking capacity resembles the prevailing approach adopted in provincial and territorial
health care consent and mental health legislation, which typically speaks to the ability to
“understand” and to “appreciate”96 the matters of primary relevance to the decision. As
Sophie Nunnelly notes in chapter X, the three provinces that make incapacity to make
treatment decisions a condition of involuntary hospitalization (and treatment)97 elevate
the standard beyond that which applies in other health care contexts and require the
ability to “fully” understand and appreciate the matters in issue.98
All adults are presumed to have legal capacity to make medical decisions at common law
– and the onus lies on the one challenging capacity to rebut this presumption.99 Health
94

See Michael Bach & Lana Kerzner, A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal
Capacity (Law Commission of Ontario, October 2010) at 47-49.
95
2013 SCC 53, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 341 at paras 19-21, citing Malette v Shulman (1990), 72 OR (2d) 417
(CA) at pp 423-24. Italics added.
96
See, e.g., Ontario HCCA, supra note x, s.4(1); Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, ss. 6, 45;
The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, SS 2000, c A-5.3, s 2(c); The Vulnerable Persons
Living with a Mental Disability Act, CCSM c V90, ss 46, 81 [applies only in respect of adults with a mental
disability manifesting before age 18, and not to persons coming under the jurisdiction of Manitoba’s
Mental Health Act]; Mental Health Act, CCSM c M110, s 27(2); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act,
SA 2008, c A-4.2, s.1(d); Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13, s. 26; Hospitals Act, RSNS 1989, c 208,
s.52(2A).
97
These are Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland (see note x, supra [citing the three Acts on this
point]).
98
Nova Scotia’s Act requires the ability to “fully” understand and appreciate the matters relating to
admission to and treatment in psychiatric hospital (Nova Scotia IPTA, supra note x, s.18). The province’s
Hospitals Act, supra note y (which applies to all hospital patients except for involuntary psychiatric
patients) states the same criteria, but for the requirement that the individual be able to fully understand and
appreciate the matters of relevance. See also Saskatchewan MHSA, supra note x, s.24(2)(ii), and
Newfoundland’s MHCTA, supra note x, s.17(1)(b)(ii)(B).
99
See Gligorevic v. McMaster (2012), 109 OR (3d) 321 2012 (CA), ONCA 115 (CanLII) at para 59; Khan
v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital (1992), 52 OAC 166, 1992 CanLII 7464 (ON CA); Starson v Swayze,
supra note x at para 77. See also Ontario’s HCCA, supra note x, s.4(2). The Ontario Court of Appeal has
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care consent legislation typically places responsibility for evaluating capacity upon
regulated health professionals.100 At common law, the fact that capacity is an essential
element of valid consent suggests that all health care practitioners must be mindful of
capacity when seeking consent within their scope of practice.
Interpreting and applying the law – Starson
The law on capacity to make treatment decisions in psychiatric treatment settings was
addressed in a 2003 Supreme Court of Canada judgment, Starson v. Swayze.101
Starson had been placed involuntarily in a psychiatric hospital following a verdict of not
criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (on charges of uttering threats). His
diagnosis was “bipolar disorder with psychotic features.”102 He refused neuroleptic
medication, mood stabilizers, anti-anxiety medication and anti-parkinsonian medication,
and was found by his psychiatrist to be incapable of making decisions about these
treatments.
In the ensuing hearing before the Consent and Capacity Board, Starson argued 1) that
while he acknowledged that aspects of his thinking and behaviour were consistent with
the diagnosis of bipolar disorder, he valued these aspects of himself;103 and 2) that there
was no basis on which to expect that the proposed treatments would benefit him (i.e., no
prospective benefits that he should be expected to “understand” and “appreciate”).104
Rather, he argued, past anti-psychotic treatments had negatively affected his well-being
(in particular, his ability to think and express himself); moreover, the primary intended
effect of the medication (aimed at “slow[ing] down his thoughts”) would in his view be
inferior to his untreated state.105 Starson’s enthusiasm for his unusual thought processes
was based in part in his belief that these were essential to contributions he had made in
theoretical physics. His doctors took a dimmer view, with one suggesting that Starson,
stated, in connection with disputes about incapacity under the HCCA an expectation of “strong and
unequivocal evidence” on the part of the one bearing the onus (Gligorevic v. McMaster ibid at para 60).
See also Manitoba’s Mental Health Act, CCSM c M110, s.2 (stating a presumption that persons 16 and
over are capable of making treatment decisions under the Act, while persons under 16 are presumed
incapable); BC’s HCCFAA, supra note x, s.3(1); Nova Scotia’s Hospitals Act, RSNS 1989, c 208, s.52(1)
[applies to decisions about health care in hospital, except for involuntary psychiatric patients in respect of
psychiatric treatment, s.71A]; PEI’s Consent to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, RSPEI 1988, c
C-17.2, s.3(1); Alberta’s Personal Directives Act, RSA 2000, c P-6, s.3(2) (presumption applies to those
who are at least 18 years of age).
100
Ontario HCCA, supra note x, s.2(1) (“health practitioner”) & s.10(1); BC HCCFAA, supra note x, s.1
(“health care provider”) & s.7; but see Nova Scotia’s Hospitals Act, s.2(r) (“psychiatrist”) & 52(2). In
mental health legislation, this obligation is placed on the attending physician or psychiatrist: Alberta MHA,
supra note x, s.27(1) (physician); Manitoba MHA, supra note x, s.27(1) (attending physician).
101
[2003] 1 SCR 722, 2003 SCC 32 (CanLII).
102
Ibid, per McLachlin CJ at para 20.
103
Ibid at paras 93-95, 102 (per Major J).
104
Ibid at paras 92, 98-99, 101-102. The majority also found that, apart from the “scant evidentiary basis”
from which to conclude that Starson’s condition was likely to deteriorate without the proposed treatments,
he “was never asked at the hearing whether he understood the possibility that his condition could worsen
without treatment.” (at para 105).
105
Ibid at paras 98-99, 102.
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who “could have made an enormous contribution to society,” was “lost in a psychotic
world.”106 That said, there was some ambivalence in the medical testimony as to whether
Starson’s condition was likely to worsen without treatment.107
The Board upheld the psychiatrist’s declaration of incapacity on the basis that Starson
“was in ‘almost total’ denial of a mental disorder,” and that, as a result, he “failed to
appreciate the consequences of his decision.”108 They concluded that because he could
not “relate information to his own particular disorder,” he could not “understand the
consequences of a decision to either refuse or consent to medication.”109
The Board’s decision was overturned by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, in a
decision upheld by the Court of Appeal and a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada.
There was a marked division between the majority and dissenting reasons of the Supreme
Court. Justice Major, writing for the majority, placed the dispute in the wider context of
deep social prejudice against persons with mental health disabilities:
The tendency to conflate mental illness with lack of capacity, which occurs to an
even greater extent when involuntary commitment is involved, has deep historical
roots, and even though changes have occurred in the law over the past twenty
years, attitudes and beliefs have been slow to change. For this reason it is
particularly important that autonomy and self-determination be given priority
when assessing individuals in this group.110
There was a basic level of agreement as between the majority and dissent on the meaning
of the statutory criteria of “understanding” and “appreciation.” That is, the first criterion
“requires the cognitive ability to process, retain and understand the relevant information,”
and the second “requires the patient to be able to apply the relevant information to his or
her circumstances, and to be able to weigh the foreseeable risks and benefits of a decision
or lack thereof.”111 Yet the majority and dissenting opinions diverged in important
respects on further aspects of the interpretation and application of the test.
Two key principles of precedential value were expressed by the majority of the Supreme
Court in Starson. The first is advanced in three linked statements. First, one is not
required to describe one’s condition as an illness or to characterize it in negative terms,
nor is one required to agree with a physician’s opinion regarding its cause, in order to
avoid a determination of incapacity.112 Second, if one demonstrates an appreciation of
the information relevant to the decision (including the likely consequences of treatment
or non-treatment), one will satisfy the criterion of appreciation, regardless of whether one
106

Ibid at para 44 (quoting Dr. Posner).
Ibid at paras 103-104, per Major J. See also the different reading of the evidence on the part of
McLachlin CJ, at paras 2 & 4, 28 & 43-45.
108
Ibid at para 90.
109
Ibid at para 70.
110
Ibid at para 77, citing D. N. Weisstub, Enquiry on Mental Competency: Final Report (Toronto:
Publications Toronto, 1990) at 116.
111
Starson, ibid at para 78.
112
Ibid at para 79.
107
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disagrees with a physician’s treatment recommendation.113 However -- and this is the
third linked statement -- if one is unable (on being given a proper chance to demonstrate
ability) to recognize that one is affected by one’s condition, one is incapable of applying
the relevant information about treatment and non-treatment to oneself and so of
appreciating the consequences of one’s decision.114
The first two statements express an imperative of respect for individuals’ diverse values,
even where those values diverge from those informing physicians’ treatment
recommendations.115 The lingering question, however, is how to distinguish dissident yet
capable weightings of facts and foreseeable consequences from inability to appreciate
these matters -- particularly where one’s preferences appear to be deeply in conflict with
one’s interests. The third statement represents the Starson majority’s effort to distinguish
dissident but capable opinions about the value to be accorded the matters of relevance to
treatment choice – including one’s actual and anticipated mental/psychosocial condition,
with and without treatment – from inability to recognize (and so appreciate) the relevant
facts. Foremost among the matters requiring recognition is the fact that one “is affected”
by the “manifestations” of one’s diagnosed condition. Inability to do so means one
cannot appreciate what is at stake in the treatment choice. In this way, the majority seeks
to locate something other than competing values or normative judgments - some
objective, empirically-grounded bedrock - on which to anchor incapacity.
The second (simpler) principle articulated by the Starson majority is that because
capacity assessment aims at gauging ability, it is impermissible to infer incapacity simply
from an individual’s failure to demonstrate adequacy to the test. Rather, one must inquire
into the reasons for this failure. Circumstances that might interfere with a demonstration
of capacity include lack of information, sedation,116 transient emotional upset,117 or, one
might speculate, deep opposition to the circumstances that have brought one to the point
of capacity assessment.
The majority in Starson ultimately concluded, inter alia, that Starson’s enthusiasm for his
unusual manner of thinking qualified as a form of appreciation of his condition.
Moreover, it concluded that Starson’s doctors had not established the likely benefits of
treatment (i.e., benefits that Starson should be expected to “appreciate”).118
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Chief Justice McLachlin in dissent endorsed the principles that transient circumstances
should not prejudice the assessment of capacity,119 and that disagreement about one’s
diagnosis should not be determinative of incapacity.120 However, she parted ways with
the majority on whether treatment refusal may be capable where it is based in denial of
illness.121 Instead, she found that a lack of appreciation may be inferred from failure to
regard objective symptoms as an illness (relevant to the proposed treatment).122 As Dull
has argued,123 the dissent thus roots capacity in the concept of “insight” or awareness of
one’s symptoms as pathological.124 Thus, on the dissent’s approach, evaluation of the
ability to appreciate the matters of relevance to a treatment decision requires a judgment
about the appropriateness of the individual’s affective and evaluative responses to his or
her condition and prospects.125 On this understanding, the primary flaw of the majority
was its allowing that appreciation of one’s condition may include “enthusiasm for
objective symptoms.”126
Should it be possible, as the dissent in Starson suggests, to base a conclusion of
incapacity on an individual’s relative preference for his or her pathologized condition?
Or is the conferring of such authority on medical personnel fundamentally at odds with
the interest in medical self-determination?
Dull observes that lower courts have frequently departed from the majority’s reasoning in
Starson by superficially applying the principles stated by the majority while privileging
those stated by the dissent, particularly the principle that “appreciation” requires
acknowledgement that the symptoms associated with one’s illness are problematic, along
with recognition of one’s need for treatment.127 The cases typically feature little or no
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deliberation on how far respect for alternative or dissident evaluation of one’s condition
may reach, or what is required (in the absence of acceptance of treatment) to demonstrate
appreciation. However, there have been some limited exceptions, foregrounding the
principle that the determination of incapacity must not be based on the individual’s
failure to agree with a given diagnosis or with the need for a (specific) treatment,128 and
the importance of considering contextual factors that may be impeding the individual’s
ability to demonstrate legal capacity.129
Critiques
One critique of the legal apparatus constructed around the capacity to make treatment
choices is that it is of little consequence in practice; that is, given that evaluation of
treatment capacity is most commonly resorted to in the face of treatment resistance, in
addition to the discretion built into the legal standard, such evaluations may amount in
practice to a pro forma exercise in rationalizing involuntary treatment rather than a
principled dividing line between whose wishes should and should not be respected.130
Apart from this fundamental concern, there are two major streams of critique that run at
odds with each other. On the one side are those who argue that the dominant legal
standards fail to pick up on forms of impaired decision-making that should, but do not,
register as bases for concluding legal incapacity. For instance, some argue that existing
standards are inordinately cognitive in orientation, and so neglect pathological
disturbances of affective or evaluative aspects of decision-making.131
On the other side are those who argue that standards of legal capacity unjustly
discriminate against persons with mental health and intellectual disabilities. One version
of this critique argues that there is never justification for denying legal agency to a person
on the basis of differences in mental functioning; instead, the will and/or preferences of
128
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all persons should have normative force, subject to legal limits otherwise regulating
social interaction.132 To this may be added the critique that the standards for legal
capacity do not reflect the often intuitive or unreflective, frankly irrational ways that
people tend to make decisions in everyday life;133 here the argument is that the law
should not place higher expectations on those targeted for capacity assessment than on
others who are accorded reflexive respect for their decisions. Finally, the discrimination
critique draws on the broad discretion built into standards of incapacity, along with the
deference typically accorded assessors by oversight bodies, to argue that capacity
assessment masks the arbitrary or systematic imposition of professional values and
preferences over those of persons assessed.
Treatment Decision-Making in the Event of Incapacity
In British Columbia, mental health legislation provides for treatment of involuntary
psychiatric patients at the discretion of the treating psychiatrist, regardless of treatment
capacity status; in Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, too, involuntary patients (who are
in these jurisdictions by definition deemed incapable of treatment decision-making) are
subject to treatment at the physician’s discretion.134 Otherwise, apart from the possibility
of an advance directive (in jurisdictions where these have direct effect, absent a
designated proxy),135 treatment decisions in the event of legal incapacity are made by a
substitute decision-maker – typically identified by way of a ranked list of familial
relationships, with the Public Guardian as last resort.136
There are three main ways that statutory regimes structure the decisions of substitute
decision-makers. These are: 1) prioritization of prior capable wishes (with reversion to a
best interests standard where such wishes are unknown or inapplicable to the
circumstances) 137; 2) a best interests standard, which may or may not include
consideration of prior capable (and/or contemporaneous) wishes, along with other
matters, such as risk-benefit and least restrictive means assessment;138 and 3) a hybrid
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model requiring compliance with prior capable wishes unless this would endanger the
physical or mental health of the individual or a third party.139
Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act requires that substitute decision-makers comply with
the individual’s prior capable wishes (whether or not the person is an involuntary
patient).140 However, there are some caveats. First, the requirement is limited to prior
capable wishes that are “applicable to the circumstances.”141 In Conway v. Jacques,142 the
Ontario Court of Appeal relied on this requirement to uphold a tribunal decision
invalidating a decision of Conway’s mother to refuse anti-psychotic medications on his
behalf. In particular, the Court confirmed that deterioration of Conway’s condition,
along with “radical” improvements in anti-psychotic medications, had rendered his prior
capable wish not to be treated with such medications inapplicable.143
Second, the Health Care Consent Act allows departure from a prior capable wish where it
is “impossible” for the substitute decision-maker to comply with the wish.144 Finally, the
substitute decision-maker (or physician “on the substitute’s behalf”) may apply for
permission to depart from a prior capable wish on the basis that the person, if she were
capable, would probably give consent because the likely result of the treatment is
significantly better than would have been anticipated in comparable circumstances at the
time the wish was expressed.145
IV New Directions in Law and Policy: Supported decision-making
Canadian law has crafted a web of protections around medical treatment -- protections
rooted in the expectation that treatment requires consent, and that consent must be
voluntary, informed, and capable. In the case of psychiatric treatment, however, these
protections are hedged with qualifications. In the psychiatric hospital context, in
139
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particular, the putatively universal legal requirement of consent may be suspended or
significantly circumscribed, such that even for voluntary patients, treatment choice may
be said to take place in the shadow of coercion.
Fights about psychiatric treatment tend to involve starkly opposed perspectives as
between medical professionals (perhaps also family members) and those identified for
treatment, on the facts as well as values of relevance to the decision. Such fights are not
likely to yield clear winners. That is, just as there is no cause for celebration in forced
treatment (even if one favours a “human needs” approach),146 so there is typically no
great personal victory in being granted the right to refuse – at least, not if that is all one
has.
The title of this chapter points to something beyond the standoff of power and resistance
described so far. It contrasts “insight” (a term often used as a proxy for legal capacity,
describing acceptance of illness and of the need for treatment) with “incite” (meaning “to
provoke action,” as in: to incite a riot). The idea is to suggest that the law on consent to
psychiatric treatment may be undergoing a shift in orientation from a primary
preoccupation with expert evaluation of the internal capacities of the psychiatric subject
to a concern that public authorities provide meaningful relational supports for treatment
choice – as one component of a broader duty to provide the social determinants of mental
health.
What is supported decision-making?
Earlier, I noted the argument that the standards of legal capacity tend to be constructed
and applied in ways that discriminate against or disproportionately burden persons
diagnosed with mental health disabilities. Supported decision-making has been identified
as a key component of a fundamental equality- and autonomy-based “paradigm shift”
aimed at displacing paternalism and disregard for the equal legal personhood of persons
with disabilities, in and beyond psychiatric treatment contexts.147
Gooding writes: “Supported decision-making refers to a decision made by a person, on
his or her own behalf, with support from others in order to exercise legal capacity.”148
This leaves open the question of the precise nature of the state’s role in creating the legal
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and social conditions for supported decision-making and more broadly for supporting
legal capacity. In fact, there is no consensus on this question, nationally or
internationally; however, there have in recent years been a number of high profile
deliberative processes aimed at generating ideas and garnering consensus on the theory
and practice of supported decision-making.149
Much of the contemporary interest in supported decision-making may be traced to the
advocacy work of Disabled Persons Organizations (DPOs) during negotiations of the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities150 (CRPD) (discussed in
Chapter 3). DPOs like the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry
(WNUSP) and Inclusion International argued for a fundamental change in the
conceptualization of legal capacity from an internal deficit of the individual to a product
of social, institutional, and legal arrangements.151 For instance, drawing social and
economic rights together with traditional norms of informed consent, WNUSP stated (in
comments informing the draft text presented for negotiation): “[A]utonomy and selfdetermination are dependent on having sufficient access to resources so that economic
and social coercion do not lead to decision-making that does not reflect the person's own
values and feelings,” and are “also dependent on the existence of meaningful alternatives
related to the particular decision at issue.”152
The statement affirms the understanding that all persons require structural supports
(economic, institutional, emotional) in order to develop and express autonomy. It is this
understanding that lays the foundation for the interrelated concepts of legal capacity and
supported decision-making expressed in the CRPD’s Article 12, which declares that
149
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persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects
of life, and that States Parties must take appropriate measures to ensure persons with
disabilities have access to the support they may require to exercise their legal capacity.153
The question is, what does Article 12 – and, moreover, a legitimate autonomy- and
equality-respecting legal regime – entail? As discussed in Chapter 3, Canada has
registered an interpretive declaration / reservation with regard to Article 12, whereby it
asserts the legitimacy of regimes of substitute decision-making.154 However, the
normative force of Article 12 is nonetheless registered in the increasing attention paid to
supported decision-making in law reform processes in and beyond Canada.155 Moreover,
in its General Comment on Article 12,156 the CRPD Committee states unequivocally the
following two interpretive positions that starkly conflict with Canada’s. First, all persons
enjoy equal legal capacity, both in the sense of having equal status as persons and in the
sense of having the power to exercise the rights one holds as a legal person.157 Second,
states must abolish substitute-decision-making regimes premised on i) vitiation of legal
capacity by way of status-based, outcome-based, or functional assessments; ii)
appointment of a substitute decision-maker by “someone other than the person
concerned,” and against his or her will; and iii) “best interests” decision-making
permitting non-conformity with the individual’s “own will and preferences.”158 In place
of such regimes, states must provide persons with “access to support in the exercise of
their legal capacity” so as to “to enable them to make decisions that have legal effect.”159
The radicality of these statements rests in part on their motivating thesis about what it is
about the human personality that compels respect for decisions -- not rational-cognitive
(or cognitive-affective) functioning, but “will and preference.”160 In addition, the
General Comment reflects the thesis that dominant models of legal capacity are
irredeemably steeped in relationships of power and subordination. In response, recent
debates have been increasingly directed at concerns about whether or how legitimate
limits may be set to respect for will and preference, if not by reference to a functional
standard of capacity.
Operationalizing supported decision-making
The roots of the idea of supported decision-making reach back to a period before work on
the CRPD commenced in earnest, to decades of disability rights advocacy on the part of
153
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persons with intellectual disabilities and their families. The anti-institutionalization and
community living movement – as represented, in particular, by People First Canada and
the Canadian Association for Community Living – has been at the vanguard of much of
this historical advocacy work,161 aimed at bringing about a shift from traditional plenary
guardianship regimes to legal regimes grounding formal opportunities to obtain support
for the development and expression of independence.
The fruits of this advocacy may be seen, for instance, in BC’s Representation Agreement
Act,162 which (while explicitly ruling out a representative’s refusal of admission or
treatment under the Mental Health Act),163 allows appointment of a representative either
to assist one with decisions, or to make decisions on one’s behalf, or both. Apart from
formal legal recognition given those providing decision-making assistance, the Act
adopts a standard of capacity to appoint a representative that departs from the typical
cognitive-based test -- instead stating a range of relevant factors, including whether the
adult has shown a desire to appoint the representative, “whether the adult has a
relationship with the representative that is characterized by trust,”164 and (gesturing to the
continued possibility of substitute decision-making under this Act) whether the adult is
able to understand that by appointing a representative that person may make decisions
“on behalf of” the adult.165 Another key feature is the standard to which the
representative must adhere. That is, even where the representative is to “make’ decisions
for the adult, he or she is to decide in accordance with the adult’s current wishes, rather
than applying a best interests standard or prioritizing prior capable wishes166 -- unless the
latter are conveyed through a formal instrument intended to override future
preferences.167 In a final gesture toward best interests, however, the Act provides the
caveat that current wishes are to be complied with only “if it is reasonable to do so.”168
Implications for mental health law and policy
Supported decision-making has not as yet been introduced into any Canadian laws on
involuntary psychiatric treatment or hospitalization. Correspondingly, there are deep
debates about the theoretical premises and practical limits of supported decision-making,
understood as a radial alternative to legal incapacity and substitute decision-making in the
161
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mental health law context.169 Yet efforts are nonetheless being made to explore the scope
and limits of government and/or civil society responsibilities for supporting legal
capacity.170
Critiques raised around the concept of supported decision-making in recent years include
the observation that there is as yet no solid evidentiary base from which to gauge
effectiveness in enabling autonomy or resource implications.171 A more pointed critique
is that supported decision-making laws (at least, where framed as a replacement for
substitute decision-making) may impede accountability for abuse or exploitation, given
that the formal source of decisions remains the individual him or herself.172 Perhaps most
worryingly for advocates, the argument is made that supportive decision-making regimes
may have a “net-widening” effect, so expanding formal (as well as informal) expectations
that control or authority over fundamental personal decisions be shared with family
members or others.173
Still others argue that the practices and concepts of supported decision-making are rooted
in the personal circumstances and social movement politics of persons with intellectual
disabilities, and are as such not necessarily transferable to persons with mental health
disabilities.174 For instance, Del Villar argues that persons with mental health disabilities
169
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may lack the familial and social support networks assumed by models of supported
decision-making.175 Related arguments focus on hard cases– for instance, cases wherein
will and preference may be said to conflict (as some suggest of some persons with
anorexia, for whom the overriding will to be thin may conflict with the preference to
live).176 Del Villar makes the overarching point (in terms that recall the difficulty
Canadian equality rights claimants have had under s.15 of the Charter) that
“‘discrimination’ does not mean any form of differential treatment, but only ‘unjustified
differential treatment’”177 Thus we return to the question of whether authorizing
involuntary or non-voluntary (i.e., incapacity-based) treatment of persons deemed
mentally disabled is justified, and so proportionate, taking account of liberty and equality
rights and any competing public or individual interests.
In light of these critiques, what are the prospects for integrating the principles and norms
of supported decision-making into mental health law and policy?
Advocacy for a reconstructed approach to legal capacity among users and survivors of
psychiatry has centred upon advocacy and peer support,178 including formal and informal
mechanisms aimed at preventing and de-escalating crisis, and assistance in navigating
and accessing social services. The contemplated measures of support include
accommodations at the sites of decision-making as well as broader social and economic
supports. Thus relevant institutional reforms may include systemic reforms -- for
instance, redirecting persons experiencing mental health crisis from emergency wards to
environments more equipped for crisis de-escalation and one-to-one engagement.179
Some draw on the Swedish precedent of the PO [Personal Ombuds] Skane,180 which
involves independent advocates whose role it is to enter into non-coercive, facilitative
where forms of supported decision-making have been implemented in Canada, there appears to have been
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relationships with persons with mental health disabilities who otherwise lack social or
familial supports, to assist in identifying and realizing the individual’s goals.181 Arguably,
a blend of civil society mechanisms (like the Hearing Voices Network182) and state
mechanisms are required if the paradigm shift envisioned by advocates is to be
achievable.183
The debates, in and beyond Canada, about what it would mean to support rather than
reflexively curtail the autonomy interests of persons with mental health disabilities where
their or others’ interests appear to be at risk, reflect a deep shift in human rights advocacy
as relates to psychiatric treatment. That shift is from an exclusive liberal or libertarian
emphasis on the right to refuse (although this remains a central pillar of any selfrespecting claim to human rights advocacy in this area) to a new emphasis on state duties
to provide the conditions for equal participation in the full range of basic social goods
and opportunities -- not only equal basic liberties (including the right to make treatment
decisions), but equal access to housing, nutrition, education, work, political life, etc. That
is to say that supported decision-making in relation to psychiatric treatment – which
arguably entails a right to a meaningful range of therapeutic options as well as supports
for the exercise of choice among those options – is one piece of a broader picture of what
it means to promote full social inclusion of persons with disabilities. This marks an
important development in the discursive environment informing mental health law and
policy.
Conclusion
The concept of supported decision-making animating contemporary debates about mental
health law and policy brings the traditional understanding of consent to treatment, rooted
in an informational transaction between health professional and patient, into contact with
a broader, contextualized model of decision-making, sensitive to how autonomy is
advanced or impeded in mental health care contexts. The effect is to call attention to the
ways that all treatment choices are embedded in power relationships across health and
related social systems. Yet this first step of reconceptualizing treatment choice as a
cultural and interpersonal construct, produced through material supports and mutual
efforts at interpretation,184 does not in itself provide a clear way forward in terms of
181
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mental health law and policy reform. As the debates continue, we are likely to see more
fine-grained analyses of what constitutes discrimination and justified limits on rights –
both rights to supports and the right to refuse.
The political developments leading to the recent interest in supported decision-making in
(and beyond) mental health law challenge the conventional framing of consent to or
refusal of psychiatric treatment as a site of unbridgeable difference. These developments
speak to the purpose and the potential of law, not as an instrument for delivering health or
for reinforcing the professional norms of other disciplines, but rather as a forum for
ongoing deliberation and contestation about the fundamental values and norms by which
we govern ourselves. What is necessary for realization of this bridging function of law,
however, is meaningful access – not only mechanisms for asserting one’s rights at the
embattled site of psychiatric treatment refusal, but also participatory parity in broader law
reform processes. At the same time, meaningful access – and with this, meaningful
conversation -- requires overcoming the attitudinal and other institutional biases that have
historically worked to discount the choices and perspectives of those classed as mentally
ill where psychiatric treatment is concerned.
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